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Do Employers Have Obliga-
tions to Pay Their Workers
a Living Wage?
Javier Hidalgo1
A COMMENT  ON Jeremy Snyder (2008), “Needs Exploitation,” Ethic Theory & 
Moral Prac 11(4): 389–405. 
ABSTRACT
Jeremy Snyder argues that employers have obligations to pay  their 
workers a living wage if workers stand in relationships of dependence 
with their employers. I argue that Snyder’s argument for this conclusion 
faces a dilemma. Snyder can adopt either a descriptive or a moralized 
account of dependence. If Snyder adopts a descriptive account, then it is 
false that dependence activates obligations to pay a living wage. If Snyder 
endorses a moralized account of dependence, then Snyder’s argument is 
circular. So, Snyder’s argument fails to establish that employers have 
obligations to pay their workers a living wage.
CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING case. A multinational corporation oper-
ates an apparel factory in a poor country. This corporation wants to 
hire more workers. Leticia is unemployed and lives in severe poverty. 
The manager of the factory hires Leticia and she starts to work at the 
factory. The corporation does not pay Leticia enough for her to fully 
satisfy her basic needs, even though the corporation can reasonably 
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afford to pay Leticia more in wages. Nonetheless, this employment 
relationship – all things considered – benefits Leticia. She is better off 
as a worker in the factory relative to her other (bad) options. Leticia 
can now, at least, escape extreme poverty. Assume also that this em-
ployment relationship does not have negative effects on anyone else. 
So, the following claims are true about this case:
1. Leticia consents to work in the factory.
2. Working in this factory makes Leticia – all things considered – 
better off than she otherwise would have been.
3. Leticia’s employment in the factory does not have bad effects 
on any third parties.
Some business ethicists argue that, if (1–3) are true, then it is morally 
permissible for the corporation to employ Leticia or, at least, that it is 
morally better for the corporation to hire Leticia on these terms than it 
is for the corporation to refrain from hiring her at all (Zwolinski 
2007). Jeremy Snyder disagrees. In his paper “Needs Exploitation,” 
Snyder (2008) argues that employers act impermissibly if they fail to 
pay their workers a living wage, where a “living wage” is a wage that 
is sufficient for workers to satisfy their basic needs. Thus, Snyder’s 
argument implies that the corporation’s treatment of Leticia in the 
above example is objectionable. According to Snyder, it can be mor-
ally worse for an employer to hire a worker and fail to pay her a living 
wage than it is to refrain from hiring this worker at all, even if this 
employment relationship is consensual and mutually beneficial. 
Snyder is offering an account of exploitation. This account holds that 
an employer exploits a worker if the employer gains advantage from a 
worker while violating a duty to provide this worker with sufficient 
compensation to satisfy her basic needs. 
Snyder’s argument begins with the idea that we have general du-
ties of beneficence to ensure that everyone can meet their basic needs. 
But duties of beneficence are “imperfect” duties. This means that we 
have considerable discretion in deciding how we should satisfy duties 
of beneficence. Yet imperfect duties of beneficence become stringent, 
“perfect” obligations when we stand in certain relationships with other 
people. Snyder claims that, when we enter into certain relationships 
with other people, we acquire special obligations to satisfy the basic 
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needs of the other participants in these relationships—general duties 
of beneficence become specified through interactions with particular 
people. Snyder argues that relationships of dependence activate 
special obligations. He claims that the degree to which people are “re-
sponsible for another’s well-being will be determined by the degree to 
which the relationship marks a dependence of one person on an-
other” (Snyder 2008: 397). Snyder endorses the following view:
Dependence Thesis. Person A has a perfect obligation to ensure 
that person B can satisfy B’s basic needs if B depends on A for 
B’s material support.2 
Snyder (2008: 397) defines dependence as follows: person B stands in 
a relationship of dependence with person A if B would expect to re-
ceive all or part of B’s material support for meeting B’s needs through 
B’s relationship with A. Employees generally depend on their em-
ployers for financial support. This relationship of dependence imposes 
special obligations on employers to ensure that their workers can 
satisfy their basic needs. So, if the dependence thesis is correct, 
employers have obligations to pay their workers a living wage.
But there are problems with Snyder’s account. To see why, let’s 
first focus on clarifying the meaning of “dependence.” What does it 
mean to say that a person is dependent on another person? We can 
interpret the concept of dependence in either a descriptive or a moral-
ized sense. A descriptive account of dependence goes like this:
Descriptive Account. Person B is dependent on person A if B 
receives material support from A and B expects A to provide B 
with material support for B’s needs.
On the descriptive account, people stand in relationships of depend-
ence when these people have actually formed certain expectations 
about who will provide them with support. In contrast, a moralized 
account of dependence holds: 
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2 Snyder also holds that person A has a duty to ensure that another person B can satisfy 
her basic needs only if A can reasonably assist  B without seriously compromising A’s 
own well-being. But I will ignore this complication here.
Moralized Account. Person B is dependent on person A if B 
receives material support from A and B should expect A to 
provide B with material support for B’s needs.
So, a moralized account says that a person stands in a relationship of 
dependence if this person ought, in some sense, to expect someone 
else to provide her with support, regardless of whether this person 
actually does expect this support. Snyder appears to endorse a mor-
alized account of dependence. Before I discuss Snyder’s position, I 
want to first consider the descriptive account of dependence in order 
to explain why it is untenable. 
As I noted, the descriptive account holds that we are dependent 
on other people if we actually expect these people to provide us with 
material support to satisfy our basic needs. If we understand de-
pendence in this descriptive sense, it seems false that dependence 
necessarily generates special obligations. Here is an illustration. Sup-
pose that Bob is a painter. Bob manages to secure a grant from an 
anonymous benefactor to support his artistic career. But this grant will 
run out after a year. The anonymous benefactor makes it clear that she 
reserves the right to refuse to renew the grant and that she will likely 
discontinue it after the year is out. Bob becomes dependent on this 
money. Bob uses this grant in order to meet his material needs. Bob 
lacks any other source of income. Bob is also very confident about his 
promise as a painter. He forms the expectation that his benefactor will 
continue to provide him with financial support because Bob thinks 
that the benefactor will recognize his potential. However, the anony-
mous benefactor discontinues the grant after a year.
In this example, it seems that the benefactor does not acquire a 
special obligation to satisfy Bob’s basic needs in virtue of the fact that 
Bob depends on the benefactor. Bob’s benefactor made it clear to him 
that she waives any responsibility for meeting Bob’s needs. The mere 
fact that Bob becomes dependent on his benefactor’s money does not 
show that the benefactor acquires a special obligation to Bob. If the 
benefactor had purposefully or negligently led Bob to believe that the 
benefactor would continue to support Bob, then perhaps the benefac-
tor would have acquired an obligation to support Bob. However, the 
benefactor in fact did none of these things. So, Bob and the benefactor 
lack the right kind of relationship to activate genuine special obliga-
tions. Thus, descriptive dependence fails to ground special obligations 
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to satisfy basic needs. We are unable to impose obligations on other 
people merely by expecting them to provide us with material support.3 
Snyder recognizes that that the descriptive account of depend-
ence is problematic. Snyder (2008: 398) notes:
If my society says that I should be able to rely on my wife to provide all 
my dinners and a clean house, I may feel dependent  on her to do so; such 
norms, though, are arguably deeply suspect.
We can be wrong to expect people to support us. If our expectations 
are misguided or normatively suspect, then we actually do not stand in 
a relationship of dependence. Snyder seems to endorse a moralized 
account of dependence in order to avoid problems with the descriptive 
account. He suggests that person B is dependent on person A when B 
should expect A to provide B with material support. Snyder (2008: 
398) refers to this kind of dependence as “normatively adjusted 
prospective dependence.”
However, the moralized account of dependence threatens to make 
Snyder’s argument circular. To recap, Snyder is committed to the 
following two claims:
Dependence Thesis. Person A has a perfect obligation to ensure 
that person B can satisfy B’s basic needs if B depends on A for 
B’s material support. 
and:
Moralized Account. Person B is dependent on person A if B 
receives material support from A and B should expect A to 
provide B with material support.
But what does the “should” in the moralized account mean? At first 
glance, it seems to mean:
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3 As I indicated, it is more plausible that person A can acquire an obligation to person B 
if A purposefully or negligently encourages B to expect  that A will help B to satisfy B’s 
basic needs. However, this more constrained version of the descriptive account also will 
not support Snyder’s conclusion, as it  is doubtful that employers in general do purpose-
fully or negligently encourage their workers to form this expectation. We can, at  any 
rate, simply stipulate that  the multinational corporation in my initial example does not 
purposefully or negligently encourage Leticia to expect that the corporation will pay her 
a living wage.
4. Person B should expect material support from person A if A is 
obligated to provide B with material support for B’s needs.
Consider Snyder’s example of a husband who expects his wife to 
clean the house and cook dinner. The husband should not expect his 
wife to perform these tasks. Why not? Well, the wife lacks an obliga-
tion to perform these tasks on her husband’s behalf. So, the husband’s 
expectation that his wife will cook and clean for him is unjustified. 
Consequently, the husband is not in fact dependent on his wife.
If (4) is true, then workers should expect material support from 
employers if employers are obligated to provide workers with this 
support. Yet, if Snyder accepts this extension, then Snyder appears to 
be committed to the following claim:
5. Person A has an obligation to person B to provide B with 
material support for B’s needs if B is dependent on A and B is 
dependent on A if A has an obligation to B to provide B with 
material support for B’s needs.
If Snyder is committed to (5), then his argument is circular. In order to 
argue that an employer is obligated to pay workers a living wage, 
Snyder would first need to establish that these workers are dependent 
on their employer. But Snyder could only establish that these workers 
are dependent on their employer by arguing that the employer has an 
obligation to provide these workers with material support to satisfy 
their basic needs. So, Snyder’s argument fails to provide independent 
support for the conclusion that employers have perfect obligations to 
pay their workers a living wage. Someone who disagrees with 
Snyder’s account could simply deny that employers have special 
obligations to their employees by denying that workers have good 
moral reasons to expect employers to provide them with enough mat-
erial support to meet their basic needs. This objector could claim that 
it is morally permissible for employers to refrain from paying their 
workers a living wage. On this view, workers should not expect bene-
fits from their employers. But, if workers should not expect benefits 
from employers, then workers are not dependent on employers in the 
right sense to activate special obligations.
Snyder’s account faces a dilemma. Snyder can opt for the de-
scriptive definition of dependence. But, as we have seen, dependence 
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in the descriptive sense does not generally ground special obligations. 
Alternatively, Snyder can endorse a moralized account of dependence. 
However, if Snyder accepts a moralized account of dependence, then 
Snyder’s argument is circular. Both options fall short of establishing 
that employers have special obligations to their workers. Thus, 
Snyder’s argument fails to show that employers have special obliga-
tions to their employees to pay them a living wage. 
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